On July 15, the IRGC issued a statement that reframes the entire crisis: "Regional energy exports are either shared by all, or denied to all."
Then a senior Houthi official said his forces were prepared to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait — the 18-mile-wide chokepoint at the southern end of the Red Sea, 1,400 miles from Hormuz.
This isn't a second crisis. It's an attack on the bypass.
The Geography Nobody Is Mapping
When Hormuz closed on February 28, the world's energy infrastructure pivoted to three bypass routes. All three are pipelines that move oil overland to terminals outside the Persian Gulf. Here's where each one exits — and what lies between that exit and the world's largest oil buyers.
The Saudi East-West Pipeline — a 746-mile line from Abqaiq to Yanbu, built in 1981 specifically to bypass Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq War — is now pumping at its physical maximum of 7 mb/d. Crude exports via Yanbu are running at roughly 5 mb/d, with another 700,000-900,000 bpd of refined products. This is the primary bypass route. It is the single largest workaround keeping global oil markets from total collapse.
And it exits into the Red Sea.
The Bypass Depends on What It Bypasses
Oil leaving Yanbu has two options:
Clear of Bab el-Mandeb. Suez Canal handles ~1 mb/d of crude plus refined products northbound. Tankers reach Mediterranean refineries without touching the threatened strait. This route works — but Europe consumes roughly 15% of Gulf oil exports.
Must transit the 18-mile strait between Yemen and Djibouti. This is where ~70% of Gulf exports are headed — China, Japan, South Korea, India. If Houthis close this gate, Asian-bound Yanbu oil must reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 20-30 days and massive cost.
This is the structural vulnerability Iran just exposed: the bypass built to survive Hormuz depends on a second chokepoint to reach its primary customers.
What Survives Both Gates
If both Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb close — or become uninsurable, which is functionally the same thing — only two routes deliver Gulf oil to Asia without transiting either chokepoint:
| Route | Capacity | Reaches Asia? | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| UAE ADCOP → Fujairah | 1.8 mb/d | Yes — Gulf of Oman | Maxed |
| Yanbu → Cape of Good Hope | ~4 mb/d | Yes — but +25 days | Feasible, expensive |
| Iraq-Turkey → Ceyhan | 0.45 mb/d | No — Mediterranean | Europe only |
| Total to Asia (direct) | 1.8 mb/d | vs. ~15 mb/d pre-crisis Asian demand from Gulf | |
Direct, timely delivery of Gulf oil to Asia drops from 15 mb/d to 1.8 mb/d. A 88% reduction.
The Cape reroute from Yanbu adds capacity — but 25 extra days per voyage means the effective fleet capacity drops by roughly 40%. You need far more tankers to move the same volume. The global tanker fleet is already stretched. And insurance for Cape-routed oil from a war zone may not be meaningfully cheaper than Hormuz-transiting oil.
The Houthis Can Do This
This isn't hypothetical. The Houthis demonstrated exactly this capability from November 2023 through January 2025, when they attacked 100+ commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb. The result: major container lines rerouted around Africa. Bab el-Mandeb oil transit fell from 9.3 mb/d (2023) to 4.1 mb/d (2024).
That campaign was conducted with anti-ship ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, explosive-laden drones, and USVs — all supplied through Iranian logistics. The US-UK Operation Prosperity Guardian failed to stop the attacks despite sustained strikes on Houthi launch sites.
Today the Houthis retain this arsenal. Iran's IRGC explicitly linked the two chokepoints in its July 15 statement. And a Houthi official told PressTV he expected oil to reach $200/barrel if both gates close.
Why Iran Is Saying This Now
Three triggers in the last 48 hours:
The logic is escalation symmetry. The US blocks Iran's oil exports (Kharg Island blockade). Iran threatens to block everyone's oil exports (Bab el-Mandeb). The IRGC's statement is explicit: either the blockade lifts, or both gates close.
What This Means for Supply
Today's picture, before the Bab el-Mandeb threat:
Tuesday (down from 37)
+23.7% YoY
56 attack incidents total
The SPR released today shows continued drawdown — the reserve is approaching the 300M barrel floor that limits further releases. Dark transit volume has dropped post-ADNOC attack. Bypass pipelines are maxed. Every workaround is either saturated, degraded, or now threatened.
If the Houthis actually begin interdicting Bab el-Mandeb traffic, the remaining supply chain architecture looks like this: 1.8 mb/d of UAE pipeline oil reaching Asia directly, plus whatever volume can be rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope at 25-day delays with war-zone insurance premiums.
For 4.5 billion people in Asia who depend on Gulf energy, that's not a supply chain. That's a straw.